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I. World War II: The "Good War" 
A. How does society construct and image of a good war? 
B. How does this construct reflect upon the returning veteran? 
C. How does the stigmatized veteran respond to society? 
II. The War in General 
A. World War II and civilians 
B. World War II and returning veterans 
C. The wounded Veteran 
III. Interviews (Method the same as for Vietnam, noted in Section X) 
A. George Boggs III 
B. Bert R. Manhoff 
C. Frank Dauster 
IV. Once home 
A. How were veterans treated? 
B. How did veterans view themselves? 
C. How did veterans view their combat experience? 
V. Conclusion: The construct of a good war in the eyes of the veteran versus the 
eyes of the civilian society to which he returned. 
VI. Vietnam: The "Bad War" 
A. How does society construct an image ofa bad war? 
B. Generally, how does this construct reflect upon the returning veteran? 
C. How does the stigmatized veteran respond to society? 
VII. The War in general 
A. Confusion of public 
1. Slow, steady entrance into combat position 
2. Optimism of government vs. lengthiness of war 
3. Instead of economy boom, recession 
B. Confusion of veterans 
1. Patriotism, yet undefined objectives 
2. Limitations by politicians on military strategy 
3. Shallow reporting=rewritten government releases that 
contradicted the time and reality of Vietnam 
C. Patriotisnl and duty 
VIII. The Split Generation 
A. Fathers' World War IT Generation 






















b. War as a solution, positive thing 
c. All young men served 
2. Cold War against Communism 
3. Militaristic "We can win anything" optimism 
4. Upwardly mobile adulthood=ease of Vietnam generations' youth 
B. Early (up to 1968) volunteers and patriots 
a. Perceived Communism as ilnminent threat during youth 
b. Grew up listening to glorified war stories 
c. Optimistic view of war and America's world leadership 
C. Late (after 1968) volunteers and draftees 
a. Knew older brothers, uncles who had served in Vietnam 
b. Saw visual images of the war on television 
c. Heard civilians questioning the involvement and strategy 
d. Low draft # or deferment=decreased pressure to serve/gave 
options to otherwise willing volunteers 
Combat and Military Service in Vietnam 
A. Strain of guerilla warfare 
1. \Vbo is the enemy 
2. Training 
3. Nighttime attacks and ambushes 
B. Strain from divided United States 
1. Anti-war movement 
2. Socio-economic and racist implications of soldiers in combat 
3. Final years and the imperative to end the war 
C. Strain from general lack of objectives and attainable goals 
1. Win the hearts and minds of the people objective 
2. Defensive position only 
3. Constant rotation of troops=new and old soldiers together 
4. Loss of surprise and force due to political mechanics 
Interviews 
A. What was the motivation for military service? 
1. Patriotism 
2. Nothing else to do 
3. Anti .. communist 
4. Drafted 
B. How did they perceive the enemy? 
1. Close contact 
2. Dehumanized (or humanized) 
3. Civilians as the enemy 
C. How easily did they adapt to combat? 
1. Justification for actions in combat? 
2. Personal moral code vs. Learned acts of war 




















1. Veterans organizations 
2. Friends in the military 
3. Continued service 
E. Upon returning home, how did they interact with civilians? 
1. Jobs 
2. Benefits 
3. Mood of the nations towards the military 
XI. Once home 
A. How were veterans treated? 
B. How did veterans view themselves? 
C. How did veterans view their combat experience? 
XII. Conclusion: The construct of a bad war in the eyes of civilians vs. the eyes of 
veterans 
XIII. Overall comparison of World War II and Vietnam: 
While veterans of World War II and veterans of Vietnam were 
treated drastically different by the societies to which they returned, their 
shared feelings of isolation and unrest evolved from returning to societies 
whose constructs of the wars in which they fought were created to reflect the 
civilians' shared involvement in the war, and not the involvement of the 
veterans. The combat experiences of veterans in the "Good War" and in the 
"Bad War" are the same, and in their eyes, there is but one type of war that 
exists. War is neither good nor bad, but amoral. The men who experienced 




















The Good War vs. The Bad War: An Analysis of Combat Veterans' Experience in 
World War II and Vietnam by Removing Social Stigma 
By Shelley R. Stafford 
Creation of a Good War 
The image of a good war, free from immorality and unnecessary destruction, 
exists in the memories of those who never experienced battle. We are taught to believe 
that violent action among humans is acceptable when it is for a good cause. Thus, the 
results of the atrocities that accompany the good cause are viewed as necessary sacrifice. 
In our collective memory, we see an ideal situation in which happy, well-adjusted young 
men go to defend an ideologically pure country. The events that occur during combat are 
simply accepted as part of war, but they are not discussed for fear of robbing the glory of 
victory. Happy, well-adjusted soldiers return home, ready to jump back into the life that 
they had left. What the soldiers experienced in combat is of only passing interest to the 
rest of society, and is easily forgotten. However, the men whose lives were physically 
and mentally altered in war make it hard for society to forget the undesirable aspects of 
war. The men who returned home bearing physical or mental wounds are the unwanted 
reminders of the other side of a good war. Veterans whose physical appearance was 
altered by war proved to be a visible roadblock in society'S effort to expunge itself of any 
guilt about war, and they slowly coerced a propagandized society to view war differently 
than from the eyes of a national press. Exuberant boys who returned home as reserved 
men caused society to realize that the events of war are life changing and permanent even 
if no physical battle scars exist. Naturally, these injections of reality into sn1all 
communities that already had an idealistic image of the war and why it was fought and 





















the veterans' perspective of war, society forced these bearers of reality to confonn to the 
popular image of an idealized war. 
The image of the good war was a concept that evolved in the minds of people 
after the conclusion of the war. In reality, the good war concept had an abundance of 
fallacies that society did not know how to handle. Men and boys went to war for reasons 
that were hardly disputed. Ironically, most men had no personal incentive for fighting in 
the war. The event itself attracted quickly made soldiers, and it held promises of 
adventure, not of moral elevation. Combat showed young men horrible things that made 
them question why they had been so enthusiastic about the war. The promise of 
excitement soon gave way to a longing to return home. The construct of home in the 
soldiers' minds became an elaborate image ofhannony and balance in the midst of a 
world of dishannony and imbalance. When it finally came time to return home, the 
soldier's mental image was once again violated when they found themselves amidst a 
society of uninfonned and naIve people. They no longer felt at ease in the comfort of 
their parent's homes, nor did their own wives and children understand what they had 
endured. This planted the seed of isolation in the veterans, where it continued to grow as 
they lived and encountered more aspects of civilian life. 1 
For the men whose physical appearance and ability was altered during combat, 
the return to civilian life was particularly difficult. The American public had a hard time 
accepting the disabled into all social spheres. They were expected to readjust quickly and 
forget as much as possible about their physical handicap. They were admired for their 
"wonderful attitude." This would enable them to be role models for other disabled 





















which made them feel freaky and defective. In fact, wounded men who returned to the 
United States were treated as though they were diseased. Coming to terms with the 
challenge of undesired public attention represented a major obstacle for many World War 
II disabled soldiers. Along with the obvious change in a wounded veteran's life, he was 
also burdened by the mental obligation of reconciling his personal sacrifice with the cost 
of supporting a cause. The wounded veteran was forced to come to terms with the moral 
void of war that called for such costly personal sacrifice. The wounded soldier was 
forced to confront a dilemnla: whether his rationale for fighting in the war justified his 
sacrifice.2 
Because soldiers fought in a good war, it is commonly believed that most veterans 
of World War II adjusted quickly and easily to civilian life. Since World War II was a 
good war, veterans committed no acts during war that would later come back to haunt 
them in the form of a post-traumatic stress disorder. However, combat in World War II 
was a terrible experience that left physical and mental scars on most soldiers. This does 
not fit the image of the good war of society's construct, because many thought that 
somehow, bad combat occurred only in a bad war? 
World War II, like other wars, was conceived as something to look forward to by 
the young men who were to go to war. It was an event that offered an alternative to a 
previously dreary segment of American history: the Depression. Young men who had 
grown up during the Depression were the same men who fought in World War II. It was 
a chance to break free from the constraints that had held them to a locality or a vocation. 
Instead of foreseeing the future as a completed portrait, World War II made it possible for 





















moral imperatives of fighting in World War II had yet to completely surface, but the 
patriotic imperative to fight for one's country in its time of need was obvious and 
overwhelming. Men simply felt that it was their duty to fight, and it was a potentially 
gratifying duty. However, the attitude of patriotism and willingness to fight by American 
servicemen in all theaters of World War II was challenged, as it had been in all wars by 
the shock of combat, especially if the soldier was wounded. This abrupt injection of 
reality into the bravado of going to war for the good of the nation and the civilized world 
was initially unbearable unless he could formulate his own moral justification for having 
taken part in it. The ability of a young, wounded soldier to rationalize his participation in 
combat was especially important. Once wounded, the soldier needed reasons for having 
participated in combat in order to internalize his personal sacrifice for the war. 
Yeterans today are beginning to discuss their memories of World War II. 
Through this testimony, veterans who were wounded, either physically or mentally, can 
verbalize the reality of not only war, but also of their difficult return to civilian life. The 
following excerpts from interviews with World War II veterans serve as a microcosm of 
veteran sentiments. 
George Boggs ill began his Army career in the ROTC program at Rutgers. After 
the bombing of Pearl Harbor, he realized that war was inevitable. He did not feel 
particularly prepared for war, but he was very charged to "get over there and do 
something about it." Boggs was sent to the Pacific theater after he completed training.4 
Boggs stated that he had "no druthers" about whom he was to fight. He was not 
fearful of the Germans, yet he did not shirk from fighting against the Japanese. He 





















that both the Germans and the Japanese had committed atrocities during the war, but he 
was not inclined to fight the Germans because of the Holocaust, nor was he inclined to 
fight the Japanese because of Pearl Harbor. His involvement in the war was strictly a 
response to the call of his country.5 
Boggs was in very close contact with the Japanese during his service in the 
Pacific. He attributes his fear of the Japanese during combat to the fact that it was they 
whom he fought, not the Germans. A significant event that persists in Boggs' memory of 
combat is of a face-to-face confrontation with a Japanese soldier. During an exchange of 
fire with a Japanese platoon, Boggs jumped into a land crater for cover. Ironically, he 
chose a crater that was already occupied by a Japanese soldier. He faced the enemy 
soldier and shot the man at point blank range. Boggs' comment about this event 
symbolizes the realization that most American soldiers discovered. He stated that he 
"could shoot him (the Japanese soldier) because he was the enemy, but when he lay there 
dying, he was human.,,6 
American soldiers went to war with enthusiasm for their mission and patriotism 
for their country. However, the youthful lure of excitement and honor through duty were 
challenged by the grim truth of combat. Justinian wrote of the same phenomenon during 
the Roman wars. Combat experience challenged the initial exuberance that a young man 
felt about his mission in the war. No longer could Boggs view the enemy as inhuman 
after he watched the Japanese soldier die by his actions. Boggs was left to reconcile the 
necessity of killing the enemy soldier with the bloodstains that remained on his fatigues 
and conscience for days. Had he not acted, Boggs would surely have been killed. That 





















realization throughout soldiers in combat. A contradiction exists between that which they 
are taught to do by the government, and that which their nlorality dictates. This 
contradiction is often magnified by the onset of old age. 
During combat in the St. David Islands, Boggs was shot in his left side and back. 
Paralysis in his legs for the greater part of a year resulted from these injuries, as well as 
internal damage. His recovery process was very long and complex. Boggs stated that he 
had considered making a career of the military before his wounds, but was no longer of 
any use to the Army. The pension that Boggs received from the Army "has been handy 
through the years," but his readjustment to civilian life as a wounded veteran was poorly 
compensated. 7 
Boggs did not join a veterans' organization such as the American Legion upon his 
return. The isolation that he felt upon returning to civilian life penetrated even the bond 
that he shared with other American servicemen. He stated that he had nothing in 
common with the men in the veterans' organizations. Boggs returned to the United 
States with both physical and mental wounds. While he recovered from his physical 
wounds, the mental wounds that he sustained in combat have haunted an otherwise happy 
and successful lifetime. 8 
Bert R. Manhoff also served in the Anny during World War II. He is from New 
Jersey, and grew up in a strong Jewish community. His youth was burdened by the 
responsibility of being the family provider after the death of his father during the 
Depression. After he graduated from high school, Manhoff agreed to attend Montclair 
State due to the lure of a guaranteed job in exchange for playing football. However, the 





















work in the Anny in the War Department. He soon joined the tank destroyers, impelled 
by what he had seen in literature about the branches of the military. 9 
Manhoff provides insight to the mentality of soldiers during training for combat. 
He relates a story about his time in training that illuminates that which soldiers about to 
enter combat held as routine. During his training at Fort Hood, in Texas, Manhoffrecalls 
watching two men insult several soldiers. In response, the soldiers retaliated by throwing 
one man over a post in front of the restaurant where they were eating. Manhoff stated 
that this incident shows how the soldiers, himself included, were taught to become war 
machines. He summarized that his training in the Army taught him "life meant nothing 
under certain situations."lo 
Manhoff s military service afforded him lots of action in combat. He was part of 
the build-up and the invasion of Normandy on Omaha Beach. His remarks about the 
invasion are that "there are no atheists in foxholes." "Everyone was appealing for help, 
whether from God or the tree in front of him." He was part of a unit that also later 
liberated Nancy, France. Upon arriving into town, he spotted and visited the remnants of 
a Jewish synagogue. During the Nazi occupation of the town, the synagogue served as a 
storage area for animals. Animal feces and other damage defiled the synagogue. 
Manhoff s response to this scene was the development of an "ingrained hatred" of the 
Nazis. Not only did he feel hatred for the Nazis because he was Jewish, but he also stated 
that the things that he saw in Nancy, as well as in the concentration camps that he helped. 
liberate made him believe that people of "all religions" should feel the same hatred that 





















combat, neither then or now. He expressed concern that the theory errlbodied by Nazi 
Germany could once again surface in society. 11 
Manhoff was diagnosed at the end of his 1 OO-day tour in Europe as "Psycho-
neurotic-moderate-severe." He refers to this disability as "war nerves." Because of this 
condition, Manhoff has blocked much of his memory of the invasion and of the liberation 
of Buchenwald. However, certain images are burned into his memory and persist to 
haunt hinl in nightmares and in daytime memory lapses. Like Boggs, Manhoff camlot 
hear the roar of an airplane without fear.12 
Part of Manhoff s disability that hindered his readjustment to civilian life was a 
strong feeling of isolation. When he returned to Rutgers after the war on the GI Bill, he 
was paired with an eighteen-year old roommate who had never been part of the military. 
One night when both he and his roommate were in bed, Manhoff heard an airplane and 
dove to the floor in an attempt to dig a foxhole for cover. He recalled the reaction of his 
roommate, and stated that he then realized that a gap existed between those who had 
experienced combat and those who had not. He regards the members of veterans' 
organizations as "phonies" whose experiences in the military did not compare with his 
own. 13 
Manhoff s care by the government after returning home consisted of a pension 
that was systematically reduced over intervals of time. By the good fortune of being 
friends with the son of a Veteran's Administration doctor, Manhoff was written a letter 
stating that he suffered from a permanent condition. This enabled him to maintain the 
already reduced pension that he had been receiving. The final diagnosis from a military 





















literally told to not think about what had happened during the war, much less talk about 
his experiences. He was urged to move on with his life as quickly as possible. The GI 
Bill urged him to return to the youth that he left when he went to war. Whether or not he 
had come to terms with his experiences in the war, Manhoff, like so many other veterans, 
was expected to adapt to a civilian world that did not want to hear about the bad 
experiences of previously good boys in a good war.14 
Manhoff s current views on warfare are identical to the mindset that he 
had while he was in the Army. The creation of men as "war machines" during training 
for combat is ingrained in Manhoff s character. He feels that the use of the atomic bomb 
on Japanese civilians was justified because "nobody is innocent." However, Manhoff 
expressed horror at the news of the Korean and Vietnam Wars when he first heard of 
thenl. Manhoffs contradiction between fully believing in just war and with revulsion 
following post World War II wars epitomizes his lack of reconciliation with his war 
experience. He believes that warfare is justified; yet he is plagued by the terror of his 
memories and by the possibility of another war. 15 
In contrast to Manhoff and Boggs, who sustained both physical and mental 
injuries during war, is Frank Dauster, who served in the Anny in both the European and 
the Pacific. He viewed the war as a means by which he could escape an unsatisfying job 
at Prudential Insurance in New Jersey. He looked forward to serving his country, and 
stated, "we had to stop what was going on over there." Dauster's imperative to enter the 
Army and fight for his country was based on both patriotic duty and an awareness of the 





















Once in Europe, Dauster began questioning the necessity of warfare. He 
describes his first inklings towards pacifism to have resulted from observing the massed 
units of weapons and tanks before the Allies crossed the Rhine River. He describes his 
image of the amassing of instruments of death as "a vision ofhell.,,17 Dauster's reaction 
to the systematic and unremorseful murders in combat indicates that he moralized the war 
after he arrived. However, Dauster did not justify his role in the war. Rather, he became 
a pacifist who opposes all fonns of violence. Dauster did not sacrifice his physical or 
mental health during combat. He rejected World War II and warfare in general as a futile 
waste of life. This is not to say that all veterans who are lucky enough to return 
unscathed from warfare do not grapple with the savagery of combat. Dauster is a unique 
case in point that illuminates the common psychology by which disabled veterans might 
justify their sacrifices. 
Dauster stated that he did not understand people who think that war is a viable 
solution to any problem due to the total disregard for humanity that it includes. He 
understands that climates exist in which problems must be resolved; however, the willing 
murder of young people by a government is not the means by which Dauster believes 
problems can be solved. He protested the Vietnam War, and supported the choices by his 
two sons to leave the country during Vietnam. I8 
Soldiers returning from combat soon realized the niche that society expected them 
to fill. People who had not been to war expected to witness the return of tough, stoic, yet 
cheerful soldiers into civilian life. The United States government provided incentives for 
quick rehabilitation and incorporation into society in the fonn of the GI Bill. Soldiers 





















The baby boom that followed W orId War II is a reflection of society's move towards 
forgetting the war by looking to the future. 
However, the mental and physical reminders that veterans carried made it 
impossible for society to eradicate the painful aspects ofWorId War II. The movie The 
Best Years of Our Lives illustrates the hardships that men, such as Boggs, Manhoff, and 
Dauster, experienced upon their return to civilian life. The main character of the movie 
lost both of his hands during the war. To put people at ease in the presence of his 
disability, he learned to present himself as genial and unthreatening. However, he 
developed other emotions when he returned home that created within him personal 
tension. Since no one expected nor wanted him to show signs of bitterness or anger, he 
was forced to repress the emotions that kept surfacing. 
The veterans of the 1940's returned to a country that emphasized traditional 
values of self-help and self-reliance. Upon facing reintegration, all veterans received 
advice literature that showed compassion, but urged men, just as they had been urged 
while they were in the military, to be tough, uncomplaining, and active in adjusting 
themselves to the social order, as it was. They also were told to use their families, wives, 
girlfriends, and mothers to provide sympathy. However, the rest of society only wanted 
to view the stoic soldier who was once again in control of his life. The main goal of the 
national veterans organizations included linking individuals and their families with the 
public benefits they were promised under the G.I. Bill of Rights. These rights were 
structured so that veterans who had experienced either mental or physical disability could 





















Neither Boggs nor Dauster were driven by humanitarianism or nl0rality to fight in 
World War II. Not even Manhoff, who is Jewish and who stated that he had heard 
rumors of what was happening to Jewish citizens in Europe had a driving sense of 
humanitarian duty to serve in World War II. However, once these men arrived in Europe 
and the Pacific and began taking part in combat, each one eventually came to a 
conclusion as to why he was there. Boggs killed a Japanese soldier in close cornbat. He 
could do so because he had been trained to kill the enemy, yet his moral foundation 
dictated that killing, per se, was wrong. Boggs rationalized that his actions were justified 
because "Japanese were doing horrible things, too." Manhoff feels even today an innate 
hatred of the German race for the crimes against humanity that they perpetrated and that 
which he witnessed in Nancy, France and in Dachau. His initial reason to enter the war 
based on duty to his country dwindled once he reached combat. The reality of war 
replaced his previously conceived concepts about war, and he rationalized that what the 
Gerrnans were doing justified his presence in the European theatre as well as his actions 
in combat. Ironically, Manhoffused the basis of humanitarian morality to fuel his 
ambition to fight once in combat. Dauster, who was the only veteran mentioned who did 
not suffer a medically diagnosed wound, is the only one of the three who is violently 
opposed to war as a means to a solution. 
Society remembers World War II as a good war because we, the United 
States of America, defeated tyranny and fascism around the world. We were the saviors 
of democracy. We helped other nations in their fight for the good life, and our nation 
profited. However, the individual men who fought daily in combat were not simply 





















serve the United States in war, but the experience of combat made the war very personal. 
The soldier was not fighting tyranny, he was shooting at and being shot at by other 
humans. The soldier who experienced combat had a drastically different view of the 
good war from that view held by civilians. The good war resulted from the soldier's 
ability to perform his duty in combat and synthesize his beliefs with his actions. 
Once a soldier who had experienced combat returned to America, his personal 
declaration that he fought in a good war helped his reintegration process. However, 
society still viewed the war as an absolute good, and caused the soldier to feel isolated 
from those whose image of the good war was different from his own. The solace that 
veterans, especially wounded veterans, were urged to seek in their families was a naive 
solace. Civilian, society urged the wounded veteran to forget about his memory of the 
war, and focus solely on that which society had created. In a good war, soldiers go off to 
combat with enthusiasm. Their experiences in war reinforce their patriotism and belief in 
their duty. The soldiers return as mature men who are to become the pillars of society. 
They are the models of manhood to which other n1embers of society defer. Their wounds 
do not hinder veterans who fought in a good war, and the manner by which they deal with 
their wounds is with bravery and indifference. These mature members of society not 
only adapt to civilian life with ease, but they lead civilian society with stoic grace. 
Society is grateful for the veterans' contribution in the righteous fight for democracy. A 
good war can only result in a good outcome. 
In reality, a war is not defined for the soldiers by the political imperative behind 
the effort. Rather, the only thing a soldier defines is his own role in the war by 





















must create some contrivance of reason by which he can justify having committed the 
action. If a soldier can justify the reasons for which he compromised his own moral and 
social inculcation, then he participated in a truly good war. If a soldier cannot justify the 
reasons for which he compromised his essence, then he is plagued by an overwhelming 
sense of wrongdoing. He did not participate in a good war. 
Creation of a Bad War 
The image of a bad war, void of morality and laden with unnecessary destruction, 
exists in the memories of those who never experienced battle. Weare taught to believe 
that violent action among humans is acceptable when it is for a good cause. Thus, the 
combat experiences of veterans who participated in a war that society has deemed a bad 
cause are unacceptable to the civilians who did not participate. The veterans of the 
stigmatized "bad" war become "bad" veterans, "bad" citizens, and "bad" humans. If a 
war will not conform to the popularized notion of a good war, society seeks distance. 
The resulting atrocities that accompany all wars are not viewed as necessary sacrifice; 
rather, they are viewed as a reflection upon a distinctly separate part of society: the men 
who fought in the war. 
In World War II as in the Vietnam War, exuberant boys who returned home as 
reserved men caused society to realize that the events of war are life changing and 
permanent. However, men returning to small communities following the Vietnam War 
returned not to an idealistic in1age of the war and why it was fought, but instead to the 





















equally isolating heroes' welcome of World War II, Vietnam veterans returned to silence 
at best and condemnation at worst. 
A bad war is constructed in our collective memory when we see a shameful 
situation in which soldiers, not boys, go to fight in a war that is as confusing as it is 
distant. The events that occur during combat are not simply accepted as part of war, and 
they are argued about and questioned by civilians for fear of being included in the defeat. 
Soldiers, not men, return home to an ideologically pure nation, and are pushed to the 
fringe of a self-proclaimed innocent society. What the soldiers experienced in combat is 
of extreme interest to the rest of society because it confirms the difference between a 
soldier and a civilian. The blame of a bad war is volleyed from one arena to the next, and 
the men who fought in the war are considered the final resting place of that blame. 
Instead of accepting the veterans' perspective of war, society forces these bearers of 
reality to conform to the popular image of a shameful war. Glorious wars produce 
heroic veterans. Inglorious wars produce antiheroes, even villains and deviants. 
While many young Americans today recall Vietnam through media coverage of 
the anti-war movement as a war that divided our nation, the boys who enlisted to serve in 
the military during Vietnam remember patriotism as a footpath to confusion. Instead of 
assigning mature men from the American spectrum with a clear sense of purpose to fight 
the war, the United States sent teenagers from a limited sliver of America to fight. It was 
a war that they were as much confused by as they were motivated to serve their country. 
American boys volunteered and were conscripted to serve their country at an average age 
of nineteen, on average seven years younger than their forbearers who served in World 





















a war in a foreign place. Their ensuing confusion at what then happened was 
understandable. 
American servicemen did not volunteer nor were they conscripted to serve their 
country to fight a fascist Hitler or a nation that brazenly and suddenly attacked America. 
Instead, Americans who served their nation during Vietnam were responding to a siren 
that had been sounded during the entirety of their youths: Communism. Yet, the 
manifestation of this threat was Ho Chi Minh, an aged socialist who had been our ally 
during World War II but whose culture was as unfamiliar to Americans as his country. 
Inheriting a situation from the defeated French, the United States in the early 1960's was 
guided by the Cold War impulse to save the world from the threat of international 
communisnl. To ask a GI why he was fighting was an absurd question to most. He 
answered in the same way that soldiers have nearly always answered: We're here because 
we're here. Some answered by saying that they were in Vietnam "to stop communism," 
but this is difficult to interpret because "communism" was an all-purpose term whose 
meaning often meant "whoever we are supposed to be fighting against." 20 Among those 
who supported the war was the sense that it was a man's duty to fight for his country, 
right or wrong. This implied a belief in the legitimacy of American presidential 
administrations and American political institutions in general. If experience in Vietnam 
led GI's to doubt this reasoning, it consecutively happened that such men lost faith in the 
political system that sent them over there. 
The Vietnam War spanned the time of four American Presidential offices, 
beginning with Eisenhower and ending on a technicality with Nixon. Believing in its 





















political and military goals of the war were rarely apparent or articulated, the 
technological strength behind the American military was often counterproductive. 
Hamlets were destroyed only to increase the number of North Vietnamese Army recruits. 
Containment policies and confusing restrictions often resulted in GI's taking and retaking 
the same hill several times a year. While a great majority of men volunteered or served 
in Vietnam because they felt it was their patriotic duty, the policy that they encountered 
in corrlbat were contradictions to their initial imperatives to fight. As a machine gun 
squad leader in the Twenty-sixth Marines in 1967, Danny Cruz commented on the 
contradiction between the loyalty a serviceman felt to his nation and the confusion of the 
mission in Vietnam: "Despite my intense loyalty to my country, my strong feelings in 
favor of support of my country, I can't help but think sometimes that the war was all a 
big trick." With such meaningless risk and loss of life, it was inevitable that the n1en who 
experienced combat in Vietnam also experienced major confusion about their value to the 
American government even before they returned home. 21 
Men who fought in Vietnam were not the only Americans to experience the 
confusion of the Vietnam War. While the civilian perspective of the war was markedly 
different from that of the veteran, it was similar in its mutual disappointment in the war. 
Veterans had expected their patriotism and faith in the nation's leadership to be 
confirmed through their experience in cOlTlbat, as had their fathers' been confirmed in 
World War II. Civilians who did not initially oppose the war expected the same thing. 
American civilians who opposed the war also felt that the World War II 
generation was able to justify their combat experience while An1erican servicemen in 





















prospect of fighting in a war in which he did not believe, stated "I would defend my 
country if it were attacked. I would have fought in World War ll. I was not a pacifist.,,22 
At first, the Vietnam War appeared in American living rooms as snappy inserts 
into nightly television news programs, provoking little more interest than any local 
headline. Americans began to expect to see the images and were no longer shocked by 
the blips in the news about the fighting in Vietnam. On the news production end of the 
spectrum, each day a new shipment of aluminum cans of 16-millimeter film would be 
shipped to network offices across the nation, where the images would be clipped and cut 
to two-minute images of the war in Vietnam. Because of the increase in the publics' 
reliance on television for its news, the infomlation that the public received was limited to 
something that was visually exciting but was accompanied only by cursory scripts that 
hardly touched on the real issues of Vietnam. The images of huts made of mud and 
straw, weary young men bearing arms in the jungle, and hollow-eyed civilians were 
something to look at, and all of it was easily erased with the tum of a channel. Writers 
and producers saw so much of it that they succunlbed to processing the footage, rather 
than trying to understand it. Civilians saw so much of it that they derived a false sense of 
security from the repetitiveness of the images. 23 
Civilians were not ignorant of America's increasing pledge of young lives in 
Vietnam, nor were they intentionally flippant about the gravity of warfare. An entire 
generation of Americans knew of the hardships and horrors of war. However, this 
generation also knew only victory and its ensuing national ride to world power. It was 
virtually impossible for the forbearers of the Vietnam generation to imagine war without 





















Americans watched each night as they ate dinner were somehow familiar. What was 
unfathomable to the Americans who were not in Vietnam was why the images continued 
to appear. Why was the war lasting so long, why was America still fighting? 
Considering the optimism of the American government, the victorious concept of war in 
an entire generation of Americans' minds, and the technological superiority of America 
over Vietnam, American civilians could not help but be confused by the war as the 
government prolonged and progressed the nation's involvement. 
As the war became longer and American civilians became more confused once 
soldiers retuTIled home bringing incomprehensible stories of combat, an anti-war 
movement began to emerge. Initially only in large cities, on the coasts and in college 
campuses, the anti-war movement garnered national attention. This movement divided 
not only a generation from a generation, but also a generation within itself. 
The Vietnam generation came of age in a world that had been created by the 
World War II generation. The World War II generation grew up in an age that was 
drastically different from the years of the Vietnam generations' collective youth. They 
spent a good portion of their childhood during the Depression, and the civilian world as 
well as the American military benefited greatly from the War. The Japanese bombed 
Pearl Harbor, giving Americans no choice in World War II. In Europe, a madman was 
overrunning civilization, conquering entire nations in a matter of days. The enemies 
were formidable and clearly evil. America had heroes, of the magnitude of Patton and 
Nimitz as well as the hometown heroes who returned home with medals and promotions. 
If the hometown heroes did not return home, they at least died for a cause that everyone 





















build their lives very differently from the manner in which they had spent their 
childhood. While the return of the World War IT veteran to America was no less difficult 
for him personally than the return of the Vietnam veteran, the two generations of soldiers 
undoubtedly returned to a different country. 
The Vietnam generation grew up in another world, the suburban comfort zone, a 
new world invented by people like their fathers to give form to their need for order, 
security, prosperity, and peace.24 It was America's promised land, a grid work of tract 
homes, two car garages, schools and cultivated lawns. The families of the World War II 
generation were upwardly mobile, a buzzword that could not apply to the youth of the 
World War II generation. Their strength came from survival. The darker reflection of 
World War II shadowed the Vietnam generation in a sense that they grew up with fall-out 
shelters, civil defense sirens, brinkmanship, and Godless Communists. The very life that 
their fathers and mothers cultivated for them caused the inherent differences between the 
two generations. 25 
Because of the sheer length of the war in Vietnam, the differences within a single 
generation emerged as an illustration of the publics' changing mindset. The older 
members of the baby boom generation were the first to go to war. They were also the 
only part of the generation to reflect the mindset of their parents' World War II 
experiences. With the average age of American servicemen in Vietnam as nineteen, 
those who went to Vietnam before 1968 were the first-borns, the earliest wave of the 
baby boomers. They had perceived Communism as an imminent threat during their 
youth, and had heard their parents' glorified stories of the war years. This made 




















and full belief that Vietnanl was to be a war against the spread ofintemational 
communism of the early Vietnam generation was a bond that they shared with their 
parents and the rest of the World War II generation. 
Following 1968, the mood of the Vietnam generation as well as the general mood 
of the civilian population in America changed drastically. While the younger wave of 
baby boomers had heard their parents' glorious wartime stories, they also heard stories 
from their big brothers, uncles, and neighbors about Vietnam. The stories that the 
younger part of the Vietnam generation heard had not yet had time to become glorious. 
They revealed more of the realities of warfare than did the stories from World War II that 
the older Vietnam generation had heard. Additionally, they watched visual images of the 
war in Vietnam on television for half a decade by the time they were able to serve. No 
longer did illusions exist that Vietnam was going to be a short flexing of America's 
military might. Civilians who did not actively protest the war began questioning in 
private the heavy involvement of the military in a defensive position only, and the 
strategy of the war seemed inexplicable to those who had ever served. With the 
uncertainty that surrounded the post-1968 segment of the Vietnam generation, qualifying 
for a deferment or drawing a low draft number decreased the pressure they felt to serve in 
Vietnam. The changing mood of the nation and the method of conscription during the 
war gave otherwise willing volunteers a way out of the confusion ofVietnam.26 
In addition to the confusion that the American veteran felt during his service in 
Vietnam due to the contradictions between his sense of duty to America and the 
government's wartime restrictions, the strain of guerilla warfare weighed heavily on the 





















invaders from the north in the thirteenth century, described his strategy in terms that 
scarcely differed from those of Vietnam: 
The enemy must fight his battles far from home for a long time .... We must 
weaken him by drawing him into protracted campaigns. Once his initial dash is broken, 
it will be easier to destroy him .... When the enemy is away from home for a long time and 
produces no victories and families learn of their dead, then the enemy population 
considers it a Mandate from Heaven that the armies be recalled. Time is always in our 
favor. Our climate, mountains and jungles discourage the enemy; but for us they offer 
both sanctuary and a place from which to attack.27 
By 1965 in Vietnam, there were two kinds of wars, guerrilla war and limited war. 
An array of American civil and military presence in Vietnam paired with an executive 
staff in Washington who had little idea of the enemy they were fighting or the society 
from which he came resulted in America's inability to fight the enemy, then finally, how 
to stop him for good. What the United States learned in ten years up to 1965 was how to 
weaken the guerrillas militarily without being able to defeat them.28 
One of the problems that advanced industrial societies have in warring on 
underdeveloped, pre-industrial societies is that there is very little value in destroying a 
target in the pre-industrial society. A pre-industrial society does not rely upon social 
structures, and the loss of them does little damage to the enemy's strength. The 
American kind of war machine operates best against social and economic structures 
almost as complex and well integrated as its own. This was not the case in Vietnam. 
A problem that the American serviceman faced in fighting a guerilla war in 
Vietnam was how to identify the enemy. The servicemen had certain territorial 
sanctuaries that, because of the political limitations of the war, U.S. commanders were 
forbidden to strike. By 1971, American forces had penetrated all of the enemy's 





















fighting. The basic military problem in Vietnam for Anlerican ground forces was stated 
by Colonel Robert Rigg, in his handbook for troops, How to Survive in Vietnam. "The 
enemy knows more about your unit and installations than you know about his.,,29 
American troops fought an enemy who operated by hit-and-run, ambush-and-hide, and 
nighttime operations. In the field, the way this lack of intelligence affected tactics was 
simple: if we never knew where or when the enemy would strike, he had to be lured into 
attacking us when we were ready for him. The search and destroy operation served as the 
principle tactic to do this. For American servicemen in Vietnam, to bait and then catch 
the enemy reduced the infantry role to the point of expendability. 30 
An additional complication to the American role in Vietnam was that American 
soldiers were fighting to protect some Vietnamese against others. To add to this 
complexity was the fact that many civic action projects were aimed at villages that 
harbored communist sympathizers. Essentially, American GI's would direct civic action 
towards a village one day in order "to win the hearts and minds of the people," and the 
next day engage the enemy in virtually the same place. With the an1biguity of their 
purpose in Vietnam already questioned, American servicemen faced the problem of not 
knowing who the enemy was with growing disillusionment towards the American 
government. 
Another strain on the GI was the method by which troops arrived and departed 
from Vietnam. It would be hard to overstate the soldiers' constant concern with how 
much time he had left to serve. The paramount factor affecting combat motivation in 
Vietnam was the rotation system. The rotation system affected social cohesion and 





















close personal attachments among soldiers and it consequentially rotated out of the unit 
men with the most combat experience and knowledge. The combination of these two 
factors was that common knowledge was not shared between the young and old GI's. 
Overall, the rotation system reinforced an individualistic perspective that was essentially 
self-concerned. The end of the war was not marked by its eventual outcome, whether 
victory or defeat. Instead, the end of the war was marked by the individual's rotation 
date. 
The rotation system significantly affected the appearance of the war from a 
civilian perspective. During the period of the war when it was on an upswing, the 
rotation system contributed to the nlorale of the individual cOlllbat soldier. However, 
once the war was on a downswing, the rotation system worked against combat 
effectiveness. Once Americans at home as well as in Vietnam began to realize that the 
war could only come to an inconclusive end, the feeling of not wanting to be the last man 
killed in a closing war characterized the low morale of civilians and servicemen after 
1968.31 
Vietnam veterans today have as varied sentiments about the war in which they 
fought as they do opinions. Instead of returning home to a society that wanted to quietly 
omit the memory of battle from its consciousness, as veterans did in World War II, 
Vietnam veterans returned to a society that had changed deeply in its social structure and 
that reveled in the combat memories of Vietnam. A situation such as this, where 
everyone in society had their own opinion about the war, made it difficult for actual 
veterans to talk about their experiences in combat. Veterans faced a barrage of combat 





















sociopaths to civilians whose image of America had been shaken by the deep social 
changes of the time and who placed the blame for this upon the men who fought in 
Vietnam. The following excerpts from interviews with Vietnam veterans serve as a 
microcosm of veteran sentiments about the war and its effects upon them as well as the 
nation as a whole. 
Ted A. Burton served as an Army medic in Vietnam from 1967 to 1968. He is 
from Hawkins County, Tennessee. Much like the background of many World War II 
veterans, Burton dropped out of high school to work in order to help his parents and six 
siblings. By 1966, Burton realized "that Vietnam was a real war" and he was about to be 
drafted. Even though he was married, his draft rating was so high that no one wanted to 
hire him. With his name up for the September draft call in Hawkins County, Burton 
volunteered for the draft in August. 
Burton chose to be a medic during basic training because of his religious 
background as a Primitive Baptist minister prior to being drafted. According to Burton, 
"I figured I could help people more that way than shooting at somebody. I didn't want to 
kill people; I didn't think I could do it. ... But after I got in, got over to Vietnam and seen 
my best friends die, a lot of them in my arms, if I could have, I guess I would have killed 
all them VC." Burton became very attached to the men in his platoon. According to him, 
it was hard not to be attached because they all depended on one another. "Grunts look up 
to a medic. It was a two-way street, I appreciated them, too." 
Burton's company was "out in the field most all the time." He spent 363 days in 
Vietnam and recalled spending no longer than three weeks in the rear. His interaction 





















He stated that he usually went on an ambush every third night. "Most of the time Charlie 
would get us before we'd get him. He would set up a homemade Claymore and blow it 
on us before we ever knew he was around, even during a cease-fire. Of course, we didn't 
pay much attention to cease-fires, either. Ifwe saw a VC, we shot him." While Burton 
recalled the inability of American soldiers to refrain from firing at an alleged VC as a 
result of the danger that it would place on themselves not to, he also experienced 
medcaps, which were civic action missions that stemmed from the mission to win the 
hearts and minds of the people. Even on these goodwill missions, Burton felt 
endangered. "Not long before I left over there, they sent us out to a village near Di 
An ... didn't sent no infantry or nothing with us. As soon as we rolled into the place, 
Vietnamese came running from everywhere to show us their little scratches." He 
remarked feeling as though one of the men who received medical attention could have 
been a VC because of the nature of the wound. However, his role for that afternoon was 
to supply medical treatment to the villagers, even though he felt it was at times 
contradictory to the American combat mission in Vietnanl. 
While returning to America, Burton was spit on in the Newark Airport by "a 
young hippie-looking thing, a college-age girl" that had seen them as they walked into 
the terminal in their khakis. Burton had heard about "what was going on in the States" 
from replacements to his company. According to Burton, "if I could have got by with it, 
I'd have done a few things. If I could get by with it, I'd still do some things. These draft-
dodgers, Jane Fonda, line 'em up against a wall. I had a lot better people than they are 
die over there, and I ain't forgot them. Way I feel, they're just walking on their graves, 





















expenences. He was hospitalized for several days for "nerves" after he watched a young 
soldier die in an ambush. However unjustified he believed the deaths of friends in 
combat was, Burton felt that the behavior of some American civilians towards Vietnam 
veterans at home was even more unjustified. 
Today, Burton returns to the war every day. According to him, "the way the war 
ended, that was just all those boys' lives down the drain. It would have been worth it if 
they had let us fight, let us win. I believe that was a politicians' war." He also stated, 
"but you know, I'm awfully proud of what I did in Vietnam. If I had it to do over, I'd go 
again." Burton's conflicting remarks, and the fact that he moralized his role in the war as 
completely separate from the government's role in the war, illustrates the confusion that 
Vietnam brought to an entire society.32 
Richard C. Ensminger served as a Marine forward observer during two tours of 
duty in Vietnam in 1966-1967 and in 1969. He grew up in a military family and had a 
stepfather who worked in naval intelligence. He quit high school in 1963 after he moved 
from a big high school in Nashville to a school of only about 900 kids. To Ensminger, 
the move was not a good one, there was nothing to be involved in, and he was tired of 
moving, so he joined the Marines. After serving with the Second Marines at Camp 
Lejeune for nearly two years, he received orders to Vietnam in 1965. According to 
Ensminger, many of his friends were going to Vietnam at about the same time, but none 
of them knew what type of situation Vietnam was. "Most of us only knew war from 






















Upon arrival in Vietnam, Ensminger recalled, "the old-timers who had been in 
Vietnam wouldn't have anything to do with me. I had to prove to them that I wouldn't 
get them killed during their last months, even days, in Vietnam." Also, he stated, "most 
marine grunts were good for only six to eight months of combat. For the last couple of 
months before a guy's DEROS, we just left him alone because he had the short-timer's 
attitude. They didn't want to go out in the field; they were afraid some guy would screw 
up their chances of going home." 
When Ensminger returned home after his first tour of duty, he felt isolated from 
the rest of America enough to request a second tour. "When I went to Vietnam, I 
believed it was my duty to go over there and fight for my country. I knew I had done 
something worthwhile, but I wasn't prepared for the demonstrations against the war here, 
for the people who downgraded me for being in the military. As I saw it, there were three 
groups of people in the United States: the older people who didn't care about the war, the 
kids who didn't understand it, and those who were totally against Vietnam." A little 
more than a year after he returned to the United States, Ensminger volunteered to go back 
to Vietnam because he "didn't feel comfortable going outside a military base. I felt I 
wasn't wanted in American society, and I was getting tired of the petty, spit-shined 
mentality of the stateside marines." 
Ensminger immediately noticed changes in Vietnam as well as the Marines when 
he returned to Vietnam. His second tour in 1969 was with draftees as opposed to all 
volunteers. He also noticed the drug use of servicemen and commented that it caused 
him to not completely trust everyone in his company. He also stated that "now the war 





















severely wounded and had his left leg amputated. He returned home, where his reliance 
on prescription pain medicine turned into a dependency that he eventually had to 
confront. He felt isolated from his parents and had a difficult time making friends . 
According to Ensminger, "probably the only people I can really relate to are the members 
of the Disabled American Veterans chapter in Boone." In retrospect, Ensnlinger believes 
that "the war started out as a just cause that ended up being a very political affair. A lot 
of people made a lot of money off it; some still are. In one way, I'm proud that I served 
my country. But I'm not proud of what I did over there." Unlike Burton, Ensminger 
justified the actions of his country during Vietnam as well as his call to duty; however, he 
has yet to justify his own actions . 
The wound suffered by Ensminger illuminates yet another aspect of the Vietnam 
War that made it difficult for the veteran to return home. In a study of alienation and 
estrangement among wounded Vietnam veterans, Loch Johnson examines the attitudes of 
wounded veterans toward the government that sent them into an unpopular war. In 
Vietnam, the veteran was not given a hero's welcome or widespread respect. The 
severely wounded veteran received fewer benefits than their counterparts who served in 
World War II and the Korean War. 33 Additionally, the nature of the wound affected the 
veterans' alienation. Heroic wounds fronl a fierce battle might be nlore easily justified, 
and might encourage ajustification of the war itself by the wounded veteran. However, 
the majority of wounds inflicted in Vietnam came from "booby trap" devices which were 
seen as accidental. Finally, Johnson's study found that men who were drafted, who were 
not committed to the rationale behind the war, and who were not officers were eventually 





















Ed Shore served as an officer in the infantry of the Marine Corps from 1968 to 
1969. He grew up in Depression era poverty as one of ten children in his family in 
Maryville, Tennessee. At the age of thirteen, Shore left home to earn a living. While 
living alone and managing the farm of a local family, Shore attended high school and 
became resolute in his plans to attend college. He felt that an education "was the ticket 
out of that impoverished situation." 
As a child, Shore had been enthusiastic about the military, and based much of his 
knowledge on the heroic stories depicted in the movies and by an uncle who served in 
World War II. He recalls feeling drawn to the toughness, bravery, and excitement of 
combat. As an agriculture student at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, nearly all of 
Shore's professors were World War II or Korean War veterans. His collegiate experience 
from 1961 to 1966 was not impacted by the anti-war movement that was spreading across 
many college campuses at that time. In fact, Shore recalls using his future military career 
as a way to finesse certain professors to increase his grade. He told them that he would 
be unable to become an officer in the Marine Corps with poor grades, and noted the 
occasional assistance of professors. This is an ironic contrast to the story of many 
college students at the time who persuaded professors to help their grade in order to avoid 
fighting in the war. 
Shore graduated from the University of Tennessee in 1966 and enlisted in the 
Marine Corps in March of 1967. In the interim, he shoed horses on a military base for 
work. In fact, because his employers did not want him to be drafted, he was placed in the 
coveted Air National Guard during his last year in college and during the year following 





















Guard, Shore joined the Marine Corps. He felt that he had a duty to his country, and 
against the advice of many family members and friends, he prepared to attend Officer 
Candidate School for the Marines. 
Shore was commissioned as an officer in the Marine Corps and was immediately 
sent to Vietnan1 as a 2nd Liutenant in charge of an infantry division during the Tet 
Offensive. He saw heavy combat action during his thirteen months in Vietnam, and 
during his thirteen months in Vietnam received the Silver Star, a Navy Commendation, 
two Purple Hearts, and the Cross of Gallantry. 
In June, Shore led a battalion of Marines into combat on Go Noi Island as part of 
Operation Allenbrook. For two weeks, he and his n1en fought day and night. Wounded 
on June 15, Shore was taken to a hospital in Vietnam where the officer of the NY A with 
an equivalent rank to Shore was also wounded. He recalled being in beds facing each 
other, both having barely survived the same battle. According to Shore, he felt little 
desire to seek revenge on his enemy, now roommate, because "he was doing the same 
thing I was by fighting. If I condemned him for what he was doing, then I would be 
condemning myself." 
Following his release from the hospital, Shore was given the job of Agricultural 
Advisor to the Vietnamese. In retrospect, Shore believes that the measure of success that 
was used during Vietnam, the body count, was not only inaccurate but also the wrong 
measuring device. Instead, he believes that the measure of success in Vietnam should 
have focused more on the success that the military had in helping the people through the 
hearts and minds campaign. However, Shore feels that "the greatest experience, the most 





















Combat was the most important part of my life. I am proud, confident, but humbled by 
war." He feels that his role in the destructive part of the war in combat prepared him for 
his role in the constructive part of the war. By maintaining his moral code during 
combat, Shore is proud of his actions in combat. By surviving the constant threat of 
enemy attack, Shore is confident in his ability to rely on himself and overcome 
challenges. By bearing witness to the destruction of war through his combat experiences, 
Shore is humbled by the bravery, loss, and sacrifice of all people during war. 
Upon returning home, Shore experienced no hostility from civilians for his part in 
the War. His only experience with civilians who opposed the war was during a job 
interview in which the interviewer was "obviously not favorable to the military." 
However, this was not a common experience for Shore and he had no trouble finding a 
job. He did not remain in the Marine Corps, stating "I would have made a terrible 
stateside Marine officer." After being discharged, Shore served in the National Guard for 
fifteen years. The only veterans' association to which Shore has belonged is the Marine 
Corps Association. When asked if he felt that the government could have made his return 
home any easier, Shore replied "the government doesn't owe me anything. I served 
because it was what I owed the nation. I didn't need any hand-out." Shore has remained 
in contact with several men with whom he served. In 1976 he formed his own 
construction and development business and today continues to work. 35 
Following any mass scale military operation, the government must devise a plan 
to return servicemen to the civilian society. This plan must be thorough enough to 
include any assistance that the veteran needs along the way, including health care, 





















under which most of these interests fall. However, it is a malleable service that reflects 
the attitude of the government towards the military and its role in general during the era 
in which it is used. School enrollment for the period 1966-1971 included 31.2 percent of 
the eligible population of veterans. However, this level of participation is significantly 
lower than the 39.8 percent participation rate in the first five years of the World War II 
program. Equally poor in comparison is the rate of participation in post-service training. 
From 1966 to 1970 only 26 percent became trainees under the GI Bill, whereas between 
1944 and1948, 35 percent of World War II veterans entered training programs. The 
situation of the Vietnam veteran was exactly the same as confronted them before the 
service: they wanted to go to college but they could not afford it, even on the GI Bill. 
Additionally, the differences in medical procedures between World War II and the 
Vietnam War resulted in fewer fatalities to injuries that would have been fatal during 
World War II. As a result, Vietnam produced totally disabled servicemen at three times 
the rate of World War 11.36 This, compounded with the government's policy of denial of 
Agent Orange damages or malaria cases resulted in a nluch-decreased health care policy 
for veterans.37 
Society remembers Vietnam as a bad war because the government of the United 
States of America flexed its military might against a pre-industrial society while 
prolonging the loss of both American and Vietnamese lives. We were not the saviors of 
democracy. We involved ourselves in a culture that we did not fully understand, 
committed our servicemen to a war that they were not fully allowed to fight, and our 
society reflected the confusion of the process. However, the individual men who fought 





















attempt to fulfill their individual duty to America. The men who served could have been 
influenced by any number of the changes in society at the time; however, the experience 
of combat made the war very personal. A personal war is not a war that is easily written 
off in the minds of the men who experienced it. The soldier might not have been fighting 
tyranny, but he was shooting and being shot at by other humans. The soldier who 
experienced combat had a drastically different view of the bad war from that view held 
by civilians. 
In World War II as in the Vietnam War, American society placed labels on war 
that reflected their own civilian involvement. World War II was a good war to civilians 
because it brought victory, honor, and economic benefits to their lives. It returned to 
them their sons, husbands, and fathers in a manner fitting of the good fight. They began 
their collective quest for security and order in a world in which all was well. Conversely, 
the Vietnam War was a bad war to civilians because it brought an undefined ending, little 
honor to the civilian society, and virtually no economic benefit to their lives. It returned 
to them their sons, husbands, and fathers in a manner unfitting of the good fight, and it 
vilified an entire generation of men. Because of the length of the war, nothing seemed to 
completely be as it was before the war, and security and order were scarce. The good 
war and the bad war reflected the experiences of the civilians who did not endure combat. 
In the reality of the men who experienced combat, and who are the most qualified 
to label a particular war, neither good wars nor bad wars exist. While veterans of World 
War II and veterans of Vietnam were treated drastically different by the societies to 
which they returned, their shared feelings of isolation and unrest evolved from returning 





















shared involvement in the war, not the involvement of the veterans. The combat 
experiences of veterans in the good war and in the bad war are strikingly similar, and in 
their eyes, there is but one type of war that exists. War is neither good nor bad, but 
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V Distribution of Diagnoses of Psychiatric Patients Under 26 Years of 
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I Method of Raising Army Troops for World War II, the Korean War, 
and the Vietnam War 
Method 0/ procurement 
Induction (Draft) 
Enlistment (first term) 
Reenlistment 
Reserves to active duty 
Total 
PERCENT OF TOTAL 
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SOURCE: Computed from data supplied by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Comptroller, Directorate of Information Operations, February 12, 1971. 
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II Educational Attainment at Time of Separation from the Armed 
Forces of Vietnam Theater Veterans and Vietnam Era Veterans, Fi~cal 
Years 1965-1 971 
PERCENT 
Less than 4 or more 
12 years 12 years of 1-3 years of years of 
Fiscal of school school college college 
year VNT VNE VNT VNE VNT VNE VNT VNE 
1965 12.5 28.4 8l.5 55.2 10.2 6.4 
1966 22.9 22.3 62.5 59.5 8.3 10.9 6.3 7.3 
1967 23.6 23.3 61.8 59.5 9.0 10.4 5.6 6.4 
1968 19.6 20.3 65.5 61.7 8.7 12.3 6.2 5.7 
1969 18.3 18.2 60.0 60.4 15.9 14.7 5.8 6.7 
1970 17.5 20.0 56.9 56.6 17.0 15.1 8.6 8.3 
1971 14.7 19.2 55.4 54.9 19.4 16.0 10.5 9.9 
Total 17.9 20.8 59.2 58.2 15.2 13.5 7.7 7.5 
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